Approved For Release 2002/02/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R003800120006-4

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Chris

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Mr. David Lawrence

Dear David:

Many thanks for your kind letter of 20 Hovember and the enclosed cable.

I have read the information that you sent me with a great deal of interest and have already sent it to some of my specialists here for a further study.

It was good hearing from you again.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely.

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles Director

O/DCI/ Dist:

21 Nov 58

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November 20, 1958



From:

ILLEGIB

Worldgram-Red ChinaL

A Westerner fresh from a trip to Red China has this to say: Khrushchev is almost as unpopular among top Communists in Peking as he is among Western leaders. Reason—the Chinese don't trust the Soviet dictator. They want another Stalin in Moscow, a leader who won't experiement with liberalism or diluted Marxism at home and one who will toughen up the cold war.

The Chinese criticize Khrushchev for wavering in Soviet dealings with Yugo-slavia, Poland and Hungary. They say he has weakned the "socialist bloc" at home and abroad by softness toward deviation from orthodox Marxism.


This Westerner says diplomats in Peking suspect—but are unable to prove—that a major reason for the Chinese distrust of Khrushchev was the Soviet leader's refusal to back the Chinese to the hilt in the last Formosa crisis. According to these reports Khrushchev made a sharp distinction between a war initiated by the United States and one that the Chinese blundered into through miscalculation. The A U.S. attack on China, which the Communists say could come if the U.S. begins to fear it is losing the cold war in Asia, would bring Russia into the conflict quickly. But if Peking got into a war over Formosa, Russian participation would be limited to arms and equipment. The Chinese had to accept Khrushchev's dictate, which he softened by promising quick delivery of new military hardware that the Chinese were demanding, but this watered—down Soviet guarantee deeply disturbed the Chinese leaders.

The Westerner says the Chinese probably will do nothing to unseat Khrushchev at home. It would be too risky considering his political agility and power. Peking needs Soviet military, economic and technical aid just as much as Moscow needs Red China's support in the cold war. Chinese intervention in Soviet politics, particularly if it failed, could be disastrous. But if Khrushchev were liquidated by Stalinists at home, his funeral services in Peking would be light-hearted and gay.

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